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Agrarian technologies as socio‑technical
hybrids. Food crop improvement and
management of land and water in
sub‑Saharan Africa 1
Paul Richards and Geert Diemer
1 There  is  a  large  literature  on  technology  generation,  and  there  are  many  ways  of
characterising the main debates. For present purposes it will be convenient to distinguish
between  two  broad  sets  of  approaches :  those  of  the  "splitters"  and  those  of  the
"lumpers".
2 Splitters  view technology and social  action as  separate  fields.  Learning new ways  of
manipulating  the  physical  materials  of  life  is  (or  can  be)  a‑social  (how  we  acquire
knowledge of the composition of matter, although social activity, does not in the end
affect the content of that knowledge). This position may make better sense for "pure"
science (cf. Wolpert 1992) than for "applied" fields. Whatever the case, technology (at
least for the sake of argument) is viewed as an exogenous variable from a soci010gical
point  of  view.  The questions  asked by splitters  include :  "how do material  processes
work ?", and "what impact does technology have on society ?".
3 Lumpers are transfixed by the idea that there is no hammer without a hand, and that the
hand is under social control (e.g. through the social organization of labour). To split off
technology from its social moorings, even if only as an analytical conceit, is intellectually
dangerous since it creates the illusion that technology could cause social change, instead
of being an integral element within that process. Lumpers create and use terminological
schemes that remind us that we are required to address a reality made up not of "society"
and "technology"  as  separate  spheres,  but  of  socio‑technological  complexes.  Latour's
(1993) emphasis on "hybridity" (the never‑ending "interbreeding" ‑ as it were ‑ of social
and technical elements in our lives) is probably as good a way as any of keeping the
lumpers' central point‑of‑view in focus. A key question posed by lumpers concerns the
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climate for innovation ‑ "what balance between managerial intervention and mechanical
manipulation best sustains the generation of healthy (in the sense of good, as well as
most‑effective) technology ?".
4 Lumpers and splitters inhabit all the main disciplinary branches of technology studies in
the  social  sciences  (economics,  sociology,  philosophy,  politics,  anthropology).  By
tradition engineering, and other practice‑oriented disciplines, have been dominated by
the standpoint of the splitters, but lumpers are increasingly conspicuous on the ground,
especially in fields of technical practice applied to the problems of developing countries
(a "school" of tropical irrigation engineers, based on the Agricultural University of the
Netherlands, seems at times willing to characterise its work as "socio‑engineering").
5 Within the social sciences there are two main analytical foci in technology generation/
diffusion  studies :  political  economy  approaches  and  organizational/institutional
approaches, with lumpers and splitters in both fields.
6 The well‑established neo‑classical (supply/demand) approach to technological innovation
provides one of the best exemplifications of the splitters' approach. Supply and demand
for  new  technology  are  treated  as  analytically  discrete.  Technological  advance  is
"induced" by independent social forces manifest in the market place. This viewpoint is
contested by neo‑Marxists. Lumpers in regard to technology & society (unlike so‑called
"Vulgar Marxists" who, as techno‑determinists, are splitters) Neo‑Marxists consider the
forces and relations of production to be inseparable ; innovations and power elites are
mutually determinative within a social formation. Society gets the technology its place in
history warrants.
7 Diffusion/impact  theorists  (e.g.  Rogers  1983)  are  splitters,  since  they  start  with
technology as an a‑social  given, an exogenous variable,  and then trace the impact of
innovations  as  they  spread  through  society,  logging  the  changes  wrought  in,  e.g.
institutional values and organizational forms, as these adjust to the presence of a new
technical element. The proponents of radical social constructivism (cf. Collins & Yearley,
1992) might be counted,  equally,  as splitters ‑  but starting from the exactly opposite
premise.  Their  ultimate  reality  is  social  reality ;  all  scientific  understandings  and
technical inventions are "products" of this social reality .
8 The  organizational/sociological/lumpers  follow  one  of  at  least  three  analytical
tendencies : the Actor‑Network approach (cf. Law & Callon 1992, Fujimura 1992), "cultural
theory" (as expounded by, e.g., Douglas 1987), and, third, studies of the organization and
management of technological research based on a broad commitment to the assumptions
of methodological individualism.
9 Since we aim to show how studies of hybrid socio‑technical ensembles might prove to be
of practical significance to development agents charged with technology generation, we
give a brief exposition of a few key features of each body of theory in the next section.
10 In a paper on the design of a British fighter aircraft, Law and Callon (1992) show that
before the plane even reached the drawing board it was the "product" of negotiation
among politically‑salient parties, and that these Actor‑network negotiations significantly
"shaped"  the  endproduct.  Law  &  Callon  suggest,  therefore,  that  to  "map"  the
actor‑networks that come together in any technology project is a significant step towards
understanding the technical design process and its outcomes. This offers scope for what
is  termed  "interpretive  flexibility" :  design  modification  resulting  from  the  tension
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between different actors, and their, at times, divergent sense of what is needed and what
can be achieved.
11 Fujimura (1992), dealing with a scientific rather than technological example (the case of
oncogene theory), links up artefact and actor‑network theory the other way round, by
suggesting that working alliances among scientists should be seen, in significant respects,
as the product of apposite (or inept) choice of working concepts. Her study, however,
offers no support to an extreme social  constructivism in which choice of concepts is
arbitrary in relation to physical reality. A concept such as the oncogene "works" only if it
is  sufficiently  on‑target  to   be  a  viable  cognitive  proposition  when  set  up  against
biological reality. But to take off, scientifically, it also needs to provoke a social response ‑
the formation of the right kind of working groups to bring about a concrete realization of
the science necessary to clarify the concept. The oncogene, she suggests, exemplifies the
notion of a "boundary object" – a distantly perceived reality that makes sense (even if
only hazily) from the hitherto distinct perspectives of two or more disciplines, and so
catalyses new collaborative social energies among scientific professionals.
12 The culture theory school concentrates on the point that values implicit in technology
development  are,  according  to  a  cross‑cultural  reading  of  anthropological  evidence
relating to institutions, inseparable from social organization. In a classic study, Douglas &
Wildavsky (1982) show that ideas about the intrinsic safety or riskiness of nuclear energy
are embedded within the discrete institutional cultures of proponents and opponents.
Civil servants, internalising the strongly hierarchical values of government bureaucracy,
tend systematically to underestimate safety requirements, whereas nuc1ear protestors,
much  more  likely  to  be  creatures  of  an  egalitarian‑sectarian  institutional  culture,
overestimate the same dangers.
13 The point the culture theory school stresses is that values are not separable from, or
portable  across,  organizations.  Culture‑theory  (so  far)  is  oriented  more  to  the
understanding of value conflicts over modern technology, rather than to their resolution,
but  (seemingly)  implies  that  real  consensual  technological  progress,  in  future,  may
depend on the extent to which opponents agree to merge their differences in new hybrid
social projects from which new institutional values might flow. Understanding of how,
and under what conditions, social institutions hybridise is as yet very vague, but given
the potential importance of the topic in a "globalizing" world, some hold out hope that a
cognitively‑grounded  theory  of  "cultural  creolization"  may  one  day  provide
enlightenment in this area (cf. Hannerz 1992 ; Latour 1993 ; Richards 1996a).
14 Social  scientists  committed  to  the  philosophical  position  known  as  "methodological
individualism" (agents making social worlds are free agents) tend, somewhat naturally, to
gravitate towards an interest in "shakers and movers" as a central factor in technology
generation.  The  most  extreme  position  is  the  19th  century  stereotype  of  the
"independent inventor". As a matter of fact, however, most technology generation in the
world today takes place in organisations (university, government and private company
laboratories and research stations). What is the relationship between managerial
variables and research outcomes in such settings ? Who are the people that "make things
happen", and how and why do they succeed ?
15 Methodological  individualists  have  a  strong  commitment  to  the  notion  of  the
entrepreneur, and to understanding what entrepreneurs do within organizations, as well
as "out there" in the market place (see below).
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16 We summarise here some features of one such study of organizational entrepreneurship
(a comparison of agricultural Research and Development in the USA, India and Nigeria),
since this allows us to bring out some strengths and weaknesses of this approach, as a
basis for discussing some examples of our own. Among other things, these examples are
intended to show that methodological individualism may not always be the best or most
profitable  standpoint  for  understanding  creative  practical  thinking  about  technology
generation in development.
17 Goldsmith (1990) seeks to understand why agricultural research has been less effective in
Nigeria than in India, when both countries endeavoured to copy the successful US model
for agricultural technology generation and both received substantial inputs from USA
foreign assistance programmes in order to enable them to do so.
18 Goldsmith  starts  his  study  by  summarising  the  history  of  organised  agricultural
technology generation in the USA, and drawing out its major lesson. A highly effective
land‑grant  system  of  educational,  research  and  outreach  facilities  for  technology
generation  and  transfer  to  farmers,  supported  by  both  state  and  federal  resources,
achieved its greatest success in the 1930s and '4Os, having grown in a way now known to
foster "good (i.e. inventive, adaptive) science". The land‑grant institutions worked well
because the overall system had grown organically, adapting to local needs and interests,
was polycentric, bound together by a complex network of richly productive collaborative
arrangements, and operated in a flexible, non‑bureaucratic manner well‑suited to foster
the careers of curious, inventive researchers. That the system worked so well may have
been more  luck  than judgement,  partly  arising  from the  fact  that  it  emerged in  an
advanced industrial (i.e. wealthy) country with a federal political structure. The contrary
idea (sometimes canvassed) of mobilizing an army of scientists under a central command
structure would have worked nothing like so well‑ scientists need flexibility, space and
resources with which to manoeuvre, and time to pursue their own interests.
19 The auspices for the transfer of the land‑grant model to Nigeria and India were good. In
the 1950s and 60s both were large countries, poised for industrial take‑off, with federal
political structures.
20 Things worked relatively well in India, with clear evidence that the land‑grant model
helped diversify and modernise Indian agricultural research and extension capacity in
time to foster a Green Revolution. The results of the Indian Green Revolution have always
been controversial, but from the perspective of the 1990s there is reasonable consensus
that the net benefits have been positive (even for the landless poor) after a number of
essentially short‑term adaptive dislocations. American assistance to Nigerian agriculture
produced no Green Revolution, however.
21 Both countries started from a similar base line of resources and poverty. The question
arises why the recipe worked in one case but not in the other. Goldsmith (1990) isolates
five factors that do not account for the greater effectiveness of agricultural technology
generation systems in India than in Nigeria :
• lack of investment (per capita more aid money went into agricultural research in Nigeria
than in India),
• lack of human capital (Nigeria has as many qualified agricultural researchers per 10,000
farmers as India),
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• organizational culture (if nepotism, ethnicity, bureaucratic rigidity, and Ivory Tower
impracticality were ingrained features of the agricultural R&D system in Nigeria then India
was no different),
• lack of professionalism (after a late start in Nigeria the gap between local and international
agricultural science narrowed ; if anything Nigerian scientists became perhaps too much
oriented to the views and interests of an international audience of scientific peers),
• impact of relative prices on institutional development (it is true that artificially low prices
for food in post‑Civil War oil boom Nigeria undermined farmer efforts at a crucial moment ;
but the boom lasted only six years, and during that time agricultural research institutions
benefited from greater government investment).
22 One factor that might explain the difference between the two countries is that Nigeria
faces (by‑and‑large) more varied and difficult ecological conditions for a country of its
size than India. Nigeria has much less land suitable for irrigation and for cultivation of
the new semi‑dwarf varieties of wheat and rice that were the backbone of the Green
Revolution in India. In short, if India had Nigeria's environment then it too might never
have seen the benefit of the land‑grant model for technology generation. One of us has
argued elsewhere that Nigeria's environment is indeed the single most important factor
in  explaining  the  under  productivity  of  its  agricultural  research  (Richards  1985).
Goldsmith  rather  slides  past  this  point,  acknowledging  its  potential  significance  but
without reviewing the evidence in any detail in favour of what he considers to be the
main  source  of  significant  variation  when  the  two  countries  are  compared :  viz.
organizational structure.
23 Goldsmith's explanation for the failure of the Green Revolution in Nigeria concentrates
on the following main points :
• agricultural technology generation (as the USA precedent illustrates) is essentially a
top‑down, elitist project, involving small groups of public‑sector entrepreneurs seeking to
build organizational empires (this is the way of the world, according to Goldsmith's
methodological individualism),
• in developing country contexts "take‑off" for any such projects depends on forging an initial
powerful coalition of interests between the three main elite groups of agents (scientific
entrepreneurs, the political class, and external advisors/donors),
• there were clear weaknesses in the Nigerian case in this regard : politicians were not
worried (enough) by the needs of their rural constituencies, a civil war was looming, and
donors were preoccupied with establishing a new international research centre (IITA) in
Nigeria (IITA diverted and polarised interests, creaming resources that in India went to
build up national and local regional universities and research institutes),
• with only weak or divided backing from politicians and donors the organizational
entrepreneurs were never able to establish a strong system of national research
organizations (the Nigerian research system ‑ by contrast with India or the USA ‑ lacked
local autonomy ; cross‑organizational networking and research collaboration were very
limited),
• if and when organizational entrepreneurs succeed in priming the technology pump, they
must then develop a client constituency to protect their organizational interests. This
happened in India where many farmers responded positively to high‑yielding varieties, but
never in Nigeria. The Nigerian system failed to produce clear successes ; the picture was one
of dogmatic extension, resentful farmers and "innovations" with no clear superiority over
local practices.
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24 Goldsmith's account pays too little attention to what farmers in Nigeria were doing ‑ what
were their main problems and what kinds of innovations they were engaged in
producing. Over‑reliance on methodological individualism obscures the extent to which
popular innovation in agriculture sometimes arises from collective action by farmers,
spread over time (as in the case of the "ancestral programme" for management of plant
genetic resources ‑ Richards 1996b) or quite wide distances (e.g. in the field of integrated
pest management, or the soil‑and‑water management measures discussed below). A bias
towards elite actors as the prime generators of technological innovation also obscures the
extent to which the basic rationale of research systems in both country may have been
determined not by objective reality but by the values of the institutional milieu in which
scientists operated. Institutional culture can be shown to sharply constrain the field of
search for technological options. Below, case study material suggests that a more level
playing field is not just a populist preference but a necessity for the "rolling" technology
generation/adaptation sequences required for sustainable agricultural development by
poor farmers in low‑income tropical countries.
25 We endorse Goldsmith's emphasis on the organizational milieu but argue that the success
and  failure  of  organizational  entrepreneurs  depends  on  more  than  their  deals  with
donors  and political  elites.  Insights  from Actor‑Network analysis  and Culture Theory
suggest that a wider
26 constituency  of  support,  involving  potential  clients,  is  a  necessary  pre‑condition  for
technological success, rather than its secondary consequence.
27 In 1987‑89 Michael Lipton (economist),  Adam Pain (plant breeder),  and Paul Richards
(anthropologist)  carried out a comparative study of the relative success of  two small
national rice breeding systems ‑ Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone. By focusing on two small
countries, with a comparable history of colonial investment in research and the same
main  staple  crop,  they  attained  a  sharper  focus  to  the  Asia‑Africa  comparison  than
Goldsmith's  more  general  comparison  of  the  performance  of  agricultural  research
systems in India and Nigeria.
28 Furthermore, they examined in detail, at farmer level, local responses to research station
rice releases, relating this information (in the Sierra Leone case) 10 detailed on‑going
research into fanner‑led varietal selection and management of local land‑race materials.
29 Economic findings (Lipton et al. 1989) replicate those of Goldsmith for India and Nigeria.
It would be correct to talk about a Green Revolution in rice for Sri Lanka (with three
successive generations of improved varieties adopted by 80 per cent or more of farm
households), and significant increase in yields per capita. Sierra Leone has had no Green
Revolution, with only a handful of improved varieties released, adopted on only about 20
per cent of the national area planted to rice, despite a long history of rice research, and
similar levels of donor assistance per farmer.
30 Some parts of Goldsmith's explanation would work very well for the Sri Lanka/Sierra
Leone comparison. The research entrepreneur/political elite/donor triangle was strong
and effective in the case of Sri Lanka, but weak and inconsistent in the Sierra Leone case.
The  Sinhala  political  elite  in  Sri  Lanka  has  a  strong  ideological  vested  interest  in
supporting rice research and agrarian self‑sufficiency. Even in times of greatest economic
and political adversity, funding for the rice research sector, though never lavish, was
protected and assigned the kind of priority normally associated only with funding for the
security services.
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31 In Sierra Leone the political classes make their money out of trade,  and transactions
associated with alluvial diamond and gold mining in particular. The mining economy of
Sierra Leone demands ship‑loads of bagged white rice to support the large labour force of
tributors working the diamond fields. It has always been more attractive to government
to  import  white  rice  at  subsidised  prices  (through  its  monopoly  control  on  foreign
exchange and capacity to raise international loans) than to encourage farmers to meet
the local demand, though farmers (historically) have shown themselves capable of rising
to  this  challenge  when circumstances  dictate.  In  effect,  government  "disciplines"  an
otherwise unruly mining sector by controlling its rice supply at source. This would not
happen if rice was being produced in situ.
32 As  far  as  rural  development  is  concerned,  successive  governments  in  Sierra  Leone
preferred either large‑scale schemes that promised to substitute directly for rice imports
when donors willingness to connive at the mismanagement of the macro‑economy looked
to have been stretched to the limit, or extension‑oriented schemes that offer patronage
to its supporters, rather than a fundamental, research‑supported, effort to raise basic
agricultural  productivities  across  the  entire  rice  sector.  So,  far  from  supporting
organizational  entrepreneurs  and  donors  to  build  a  strong  rice  research  sector,
government (even in the early days of independence) threatened to by‑pass research
altogether  in  favour  of  a  succession  of  bi‑lateral  and  volunteer‑run  small‑scale  rice
production initiatives. These schemes were based on SE Asian technological blueprints,
with little if any attempt to adapt them to the environmental and social realities of the
Sierra Leonean rural scene.
33 Thus a major feature of Goldsmith's organizational entrepreneurship model ‑ the relative
strength  of  the  triangular  alliance  of  organizational  empire  builders,  politicians  and
donors in Sri Lanka, and its clear weakness in the case of Sierra Leone ‑ helps once again
explain  the  low research  productivity of  the  African  system,  compared  to  its  Asian
counterpart.  Goldsmith does  not  cite  Actor‑Network  literature,  but  his  focus  on  the
apparently decisive significance of the triangle of elite decision making forces is, in effect,
a version of the Actor‑Network argument. One strength of an explicit Actor‑  Network
approach is  that  it  prompts a  fuller  and careful  mapping of  all  social  links likely to
influence the thinking and actions of research decision makers. Once this fuller network
structure becomes apparent, culture theory approaches help raise questions about what
kinds  of  "hidden"  values  might  be  implicit  in  networks  with  different  structural
properties.
34 This is the approach that might then be taken to explaining important aspects of the
Sierra Leone‑Sri Lanka comparison not well accounted for by a rather narrow focus on
elite actors.
35 To our mind, the two major unexplained aspects of the comparison are as follows :
• although the Sierra Leone public‑sector research system was not as successful as its Sri
Lankan equivalent, we still have to explain the fact that it produced some successes
(between 5 and 10 superior rice releases from c. 1965‑1980 now grown on about 20 per cent
of ail rice farm land in the country),
• second, the process through which this adaptive success has been achieved in Sierra Leone
(an emphasis on researching the potential of locally‑adapted germplasm as well as Green
Revolution exotic material) is not dissimilar to the rice improvement breeding strategy
pursued over a similar period in Sri Lanka, and in both cases the national system had
consciously at times to resist the standard Green Revolution approach in this area.
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36 Both these points will now be examined in turn.
37 Point 1. Careful analysis of adoption patterns shows quite clearly that many rice adoptions
by all classes of small‑scale farmer in Sierra Leone up to 1987 were spontaneous, seed
being  acquired  through  informal  farmer‑to‑farmer  channels  and  not  as  a  result  of
extension service patronage or subsidy. The evidence also shows that farmers re‑acquired
these varieties if  and when they were "lost" through accidents.  There is  little direct
evidence that the modern varieties (MVs) outyield the average for farmers' varieties of
rice  under  local  management  (IVs).  But  Lipton  et  al  argue  that  a  straight  MV/IV
comparison would make sense only if farmers were replacing IV s with MV s. What they
do instead, in the Sierra Leone case, is to manage a repertoire of seed choices to maximise
output  over  varied  soil  conditions.  There  is  clear  evidence  that  farmers  do  a  lot  of
adaptive testing until they find the niche where an MV performs well within their farm,
then squeeze out the least productive IV of its class in their current repertoire. Thus
there is no shame in the idea that an MV performs only up to the standard for the
farmer's repertoire, since its presence has likely raised the average performance across
that repertoire. Thus, researchers must be doing something right, and farmers are fairly
vigorously screening breeder's  releases,  with a  mix‑and‑match mentality,  to  find out
what works where for them at appropriate moments. Although the relevant population
genetics surveys have not yet been undertaken it seems quite possible that researchers
have, in effect, been strengthening the gene pool for farmer‑managed land‑races of rice
in Sierra Leone.
38 Point 2. The standard Green Revolution approach to rice breeding in the 1960s and '70s
was a product of work at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines (cf.
Chandler 1972).  The first  short‑straw (semi‑dwarf)  rices were produced by crossing a
Taiwanese variety containing a dwarfing gene with tropical varieties from Indonesia. The
IRRI plant ideotype (Donald 1968) was a semi‑dwarf, short‑duration variety with weak
tillering properties.  The short,  weak‑tillering IRRI varieties could be planted at much
greater  densities  (thus  utilising more of  the  available  water  and sunlight)  and more
frequently (twice or sometimes three times in one year) thus vastly improving outputs on
intensely‑worked, well‑managed Asian wetlands.
39 Sierra Leone farmers still derive more than half their rice from rain‑fed uplands. Most
farmers make use of a variety of wetland environments for supplementary purposes, and
the relative importance of rice grown on wetlands is increasing with rime, as population
pressure  on  land  increases.  However,  few  farmers  yet  have  access  to  well‑managed
wetland, and lack the labour, in the short term, to improve natural wetlands by levelling
them and building water‑control  structures.  Thus an attempt to  introduce IRRI‑style
semidwarfs in the 1960s and '70s was highly premature. What farmers were looking for at
the  time,  and  still  look  for  today,  were  durable  strongly‑tillering  and  therefore
weed‑competitive types suited to upland intercropping and to types suited to variable
flood conditions in low‑input wetlands, of moderate height and improved earliness.
40 IRRI breeders began to recognise these needs in the 1980s, but up to that point Sierra
Leone national  rice breeders were on their  own.  In fact  they had,  at  times,  to swim
against the stream. The story still resonates among rice scientists in Sierra Leone of a
visit by an IRRI breeder to Rokupr Rice Research Station in the mid 1960s. Rokupr was set
up to solve the problems associated with tidal‑pumped wetlands along Sierra Leones's
drowned  coastline.  The  IRRI  party  asked  to  see  the  main  experimental  site,  a
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tidally‑pumped polder. When the daily tides receded the visitor met the IRRI semi‑dwarf
varieties looking rather sorry for themselves by comparison with taller local releases. The
local  breeders  to  this  day believe that  the visitor  considered this  reflected badly  on
management  of  trials  of  IRRI  material  by  Sierra  Leonean  researchers,  not  on  the
appropriateness of IRRI semi‑dwarf material to Sierra Leonean conditions.
41 In a way, this visit proved a blessing in disguise, since it minimised the ties between the
international  and  national  system  that  might  otherwise  have  dominated  research
programmes at Rokupr. If it is true (as national breeders believe) that the international
institutions  rather  looked  down  upon  them,  this  provided  a  stimulus  for  a  more
locally‑focused breeding approach influenced by the breeder G.S. Banya.
42 Banya had no formal degree‑level qualifications. He had learnt his breeding entirely as a
practical skill as a field assistant to an earlier generation of expatriate breeders. Although
an experienced breeder of many years standing, Banya's lack of formal qualifications
restricted his chances to join the "brain drain" from Sierra Leone. He did not see the need
to go "back to school",  but  reports  having spent  much of  his  leave interacting with
farmers in his family village in Kailahun instead. This village was a "hot spot" for upland
land‑races of rice in hilly eastern Sierra Leone.
43 During these visits Banya acquired much potentially interesting germplasm, with which
he then worked in Rokupr. At a time when the rice research world was agog with the new
semi‑dwarf IRRI crosses, Banya was working to a different, and older, plant improvement
plan,  insisting  that  the  potential  of  locally  adapted  germplasm  had  not  yet  been
exhausted. A number of his choices, notably ROK3 and ROK16, were pure‑line selections
of material he had noted as favourites in the farming community in Kailahun, others were
crosses with some local parentage.
44 These Banya selections (especially ROK3 and ROK16) are among the most successful and
wide‑spread of all releases from Rokupr in the past 30 years. ROK3 has had a major impact
on  upland  farmers  in  NW  Sierra  Leone  where  it  was  hitherto  unknown.  As  a
fertiliser‑responsive medium‑tall, medium‑duration variety adapted to both upland and
wetland  conditions  it  has  been  a  major  success  especially  in  the  seasonally‑flooded
low‑fertility boli grassland regions of Sierra Leone. ROK16 is increasingly recognised as a
good, blast‑tolerant short‑to‑medium duration variety well adapted to upland farming
conditions  throughout  the  country.  Its  long  awns  give  good  protection  against  bird
damage, a major preoccupation of farmers throughout West Africa. The variety has been
successfully introduced into neighbouring countries.
45 Even in the mid‑60s, national rice researchers in Sierra Leone were arguing that IRRI
short‑straw varieties were not suited to local conditions. Provoked by a specific incident,
and finding it difficult to get international breeders to take their objections seriously,
national breeders, led by G S Banya, followed their own path. Although it was a low‑input
(and therefore low impact) programme, following this path has produced enough results
to confirm that it was not misconceived. Today, the international climate has changed.
Rice breeders now take seriously their responsibilities to a majority of farmers working in
difficult  conditions  without  good water  control.  Even so,  national  breeders  in  Sierra
Leone have not yet had much credit for following a path for which there is now much
more international recognition.
46 The discovery of this path owes much to the Actor Networks within which Sierra Leone
breeders found themselves. "Blocked" from participating as fully as they might otherwise
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have done in an international network dominated by IRRI perspectives, Banya and others
discovered, early on, the merits of what is now called "farmer‑participatory" research.
Sierra Leone is  a small  country,  and the national  research system is  too small  to be
heavily  hierarchical.  The  rural  areas  are  never  far  from the  experience  of  even the
educated elite. Several of the key figures in rice research in Sierra Leone not only came
from rural backgrounds, but as Banya's case suggests, are still fully engaged in the social
realities of rural life. Banya was not sitting on farms in the village as part of a formal
exercise in "participatory research" or plant exploration, but as a member of the local
community home "on leave". His sense of where the problem lay, and what might be
achieved  by  the  application  of  technological  principles,  was  not  a  text‑book,  or
international  "jet‑set"  view  of  things,  but  arose,  according  to  his  own  account  in
interviews, as an extension of his social engagement in village affairs. Several other key
researchers in the Sierra Leone national system have similarly found their own way to a
version of agrarian techno‑populism through familiarity with, and involvement in, the
egalitarian institutions and institutional values that continue to dominate rural life in
Sierra Leone. They have had the intellectual self‑confidence born of this socialization to
"buck the trend", despite a lack of resources, encouragement and recognition.
47 The points we want to draw out of this interpretation of events are as follow : 
• Actor‑Networks that are structured and positioned differently generate different kinds of
innovations from the same body of scientific theory,
• these alternative technical options may be the product of different kinds of socialization,
and cannot therefore directly be reached through formalistic attempts at "participatory
research",
• the key factor in the story of rice innovations in Sierra Leone may be the distinct sets of
values generated by continued participation in village social institutions (as would be
predicted by Culture Theory),
• it would seem as if rice researchers in Sierra Leone have been involved in a double
"hybridization" ‑ between different social institutions (the worlds of formal research and
the village), as well as the Latourian hybridization of social forces and technical artefacts.
48 More insight  is  needed into this  double  hybridization that  characterizes  the field  of
agrarian technology generation in SSA. In preparing the ground for theory it seems a
fertile idea to also follow closely some of the ways in which land and water engineers in
successful projects were socialized by their working environment Our examination of
three cases shows, in a way not dissimilar to the history of plant breeding discussed just
now,  that  the  joint  socializiation  of  farmers  and  engineers  interacts  with  cognitive
aspects of both "indigenous knowledge" and "standard" professional practice, to generate
viable solutions that are hybrid in both the Latourian sense and the sense that they are
mixes of local and “European” values and practices.
49 Many governments in SSA have wished to intensify the agricultural use of land to feed
growing populations.  Officials  looked for  solutions in plant  breeding,  large irrigation
schemes and mechanized dry land farming. These projects were not always, and perhaps
only rarely,  successful.  In this  section we focus on cases of  intensified land use that
occurred under conditions of farmer impetus and government support.
50 The cases originated in projects that pursued other goals than the intensification of land
use. One aimed at food relief through irrigation schemes in an area stricken by drought,
another at conservation by having farmers plant grass ridges and build terraces and our
third example initially planned contour dikes and dams to protect watersheds against
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erosion. We will give attention to the social networks from which the schemes, terraces
and dams emerged, to the networks through which they spread and to the cognitive
shifts that were required from the technicians involved in these networks ; But first we
will present the sites and technologies.
51 Persons sailing on a pirogue on the Senegal river upstream from the delta see over 800
pumpsets,  either  floating on the river,  on the left  bank,  or  mounted on wheels  and
located on the embankment itself, on the right bank. When travelling between July and
November they hear the engines hum to pump water through 20 cm diameter pipes to the
levee 8 ‑ 12 m higher. When the travellers climb across the levee their eyes meet a green
rice field of 20‑25 ha or its multiple, usually against a backdrop of floodplain forest that
survived the scheme and/or new village minarets. The travellers might have difficulty
imagining that these fields were not there some fifteen years ago and that people started
growing irrigated rice only during the 1980s.
52 Similarly,  the Usambara Mountains in east‑central Tanzania today contain slopes and
sometimes  entire  hillsides  that  are  the  delight  of  the  conservationist.  Kilometres  of
terraces follow the contours of the steep slopes and fruit trees line the terraces or are
planted on the terraces themselves. Where the terraces stop, visitors May notice rapidly
degrading hillsides or see terraces in the making.
53 Our  third  example  lies  in  Burkina  Faso's  North Central  Province.  Any visitor  to  the
province  notices  that  the  gently  undulating  landscape  consists  of  denuded bill  sides
meeting arid, nearly treeless plains. Some gulleys menace the road, and other ones have
actually  ravaged  it  Many  if  not  most  inhabitants  migrate  out  the  area  when  adult,
preferring Burkina's terres neuves, Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa plantations or a city. Against these
apparent odds, technicians have found a way of weaving two land and water management
technologies into the social and economic fabric of the area.
54 Engineers in the colonial and postcolonial governments of Senegal have, right from the
start of this century, planned irrigation schemes in the clayey floodplain of the Middle
course  the  Senegal  river.  Taking  as  given  the  unquestioned  yet  social  fact  that  the
government  wished  to  use  the  physical  irrigation  potential  to  produce  rice  to  stop
imports, they adopted the splitters' view of irrigation development as a purely physical
exercise.
55 The splitters' view May schematically be said to encourage engineers to first identify sites
with sufficient physical potential for rice, e.g. sites where production is constrained by
lack of water but that can be linked to a canal conveying irrigation water, that have a
gradient of less than 2‑3% and a soil composed for at least 30% of clay particles. Once a
site has been selected, the size of the scheme is determined, along with the size of the
plots. The designer then sets to work, calculating first the water requirements taking into
account the climate, the transpiration of the crop and the storage capacity of the soil. He
then fixes percentages for the loss of water in the canals due to infiltration and seepage
and proceeds to designing a network of canals whose construction requires a minimum of
earth movement The exercise is finished with the prescription of a rotation of the water
over blocks of plots.
56 If farmers had not already inhabited the plain before the colonial engineers arrived on
the scene, this view could have been put into practice. As it was, however, the inhabitants
already shaped this plain by felling all trees and bushes in the low lying areas. At these
spots the floodwater infiltrates into the soil and sorghum can be grown on the residual
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moisture once the water recedes. This cultivation practice is vital since in this semi‑arid
environment rainfed crops succeed only every 2 or 3 years.
57 This  aménagement/adaptation of  the  floodplain  needed  to  be  destroyed  if  irrigation
schemes were to be built. Administration officials rightly feared the resistance that the
population might put up against such plans. In 1939 however, with a view to the threat of
WW2, the government ran some experiments with schemes for partial  water control.
These failed, probably due to the impredictability of the flood level, land tenure conflicts
and management conflicts about when to drain the water.
58 From that moment on, the government directed its irrigation investments away from the
floodplain to the sparsely populated delta of that same river. There it built several 1000
ha schemes for full water control. They were centrally managed, with the farmers in the
role of tenants only,  formally dependent on the irrigation agency's appraisal of their
harvests for a continuation of their yearly lease. The government built only one such
scheme in the valley, at Nianga in 1978.
59 In the meantime, farmers in the valley experimented with pumpsets on the sites where
the government had run its experiments for partial water control. In 1967 an official of
Mauritania's cooperatives advised farmers to construct a scheme on the light sandy soil
of the levee rather than in the heavy clays of the depression that can hardly be worked by
hand.  It  is  possible that  this  joint  farmer‑official  experiment lies  at  the origin of  an
irrigation artefact that farmers and technicians have replicated over 800 times. It consists
of a pumpset with a 20 hp diesel engine linked to 20 cm diameter pipes that raise the
water 8‑12 m to a spilling basin on the levee. From there the water is distributed to about
20 hectares of plots through a network of canals and ditches. The levee land was of little
agricultural  value  before  the  scheme was  built.  It  was  usually  cleared by  the  future
irrigators themselves, sometimes with assistance from their government.
60 This locally shaped artefact quickly conquered the entire valley. Its quick replication was
due to a combination of conditions. Due to population growth, about half the population
no longer had any kind of access to the fertile, vital fields of the floodplain. Per capita
agricultural yields must have been dropping for over a decade. The drought that swept
the Sahel in the 1970s in some years excluded up to 90% from access to the floodplain and
brought the production crisis to a head. The schemes appeared to show a route around
the famine. The inhabitants put their Mauritanian and Senegalese governments under
pressure  to  provide  quick  financial  and  technical  assistance  to  the  farmers.  These
governments  were  reluctant  at  first,  as  they  feared  that  the  village  schemes  would
jeopardize the realization of their dreams for large irrigation in the depressions. Electoral
incentives  then made the President  of  Senegal  shift  his  position and act  against  the
wishes  of  his  technicians.  He  solicited  donor  governments  to  supply  technical  and
financial aid for construction. Farmers had enough cash to start up each irrigation season
and buy fuel and lubricants thanks to a practice of small trade in the dry season and,
especially  on  the  left  bank,  remittances  from male  migrants  to  France  (Diemer  and
Huibers 1990). 2
61 Suddenly,  the farmers  opened the valley for  irrigation but  they opened it  for  20 ha
schemes on the levees and not for 1 000 ha schemes on the clayey depressions, the type of
schemes that the officials had imagined. The schemes are now a fixed part of the valley's
farming system and reinforce its weakened wet foot,  making the whole system more
stable than it probably ever was. 3
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62 The replication of these schemes required considerable cognitive adaptation from the
engineers and technicians involved. Very few if any engineers would propose to pump
water from a river to irrigate a water demanding crop like rice sown or planted in sandy
soil in the semi‑arid Sahel. If uttered to colleagues, the engineer would be ridiculed for
the idea runs counter to at least five basic precepts. First, a semi‑arid climate requires
crops that demand little water, like sorghum, mais and millet, not a crop originating from
swamps like rice. Second, irrigation schemes should be built on soils that provide much
better storage than the sandy levees. Third, rice in particular should be grown on clayey
soils  capable  of  retaining  much water  because  rice  requires  standing  water.  Fourth,
pumping water involves making expenses that must be recovered by selling part of the
crop. Eating 80‑100% of the crop, like the inhabitants do, makes no economic sense in the
normal  meaning of  that  word.  Fifth,  irrigation requires  a  type of  discipline and rice
growing a type of knowledge and capability that people build up only slowly, an idea
inspired by the notion of the hydraulic society.
63 How did irrigation technicians deal  with the cognitive shifts  required ? One frequent
response was to improve the schemes and bring them up to standard. The ditches were
straightened  that  agronomists  had  designed  to  follow  the  contour  lines  and  that
meandered through the scheme, totalling more length and therefore losing more water
through seepage and percolation than needed if the canals were straight. The schemes
were equipped with division structures that would help the farmers to keep the canals
straight when maintaining them. Another reaction was to mount a research project to
improve irrigation efficiencies.  When villages wanted new schemes or extensions but
complained of the high pumping costs, technicians pointed to the possibility of building
the schemes on the fringes of the levee rather than on top it. Here the soils contain clay
particles and the infiltration rate of water is lower. Consequently, from 1985 on, most
schemes were built on these fringes.
64 How did technicians alleviate the dissonance created in the minds of the majority by the
fact that the people spent money on pumping to produce a crop they ate ? A solution
frequently heard in European circles was that the schemes were a form of food aid. The
conventional  economic  precept  was  declared  irrelevant  because  in  their  view  the
schemes did not have an economic objective but aimed at social welfare. Not ail engineers
however, adopted this point of view. There are also examples of engineers who combated
the modus of economic operandi. They insisted on the need to grow tomatoes for local
factories as a means of generating cash for operation.
65 A  form  of  dissonance  reduction,  heard  mostly  in  Senegalese  circles,  consisted  of
pretending that the 20 ha schemes would teach the farmers how to manage irrigated rice
so that when at last the government would build the large and technically advanced
schemes, it would find an experienced and knowledgeable population.
66 The case of the village schemes allows us to make three points. First, the notion of actor
networks  shaping  artefacts  should  be  taken  literally  and  not  figuratively.  Networks
consisting only of engineers came up with concepts for water control that differed in
many  physical  respects  from  the  concept  that  resulted  from  the  network  to which
farmers belonged also. These differences concerned the site, the size and the hydraulic
infrastructure.  Second,  the  development  and especially  the  replication of  the  village
scheme was favoured by the fact that the President of Senegal needed the votes of the
valley's inhabitants for himself and his party to stay in office. For that reason he was
willing to override the points of view of his technical planners in the irrigation agency
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and the Departments of Agriculture and Water Development. His action shows the impact
on irrigation development of the balance of power between citizens and government.
Third, the network that developed the concept of the village scheme differed from the
hundreds of networks that replicated the village scheme, and the replication networks
differed  again  from  the  networks  through  which  the  schemes  are  today  used  and
managed.
67 Let us now turn to the Usambara mountains in Tanzania. The area is well endowed with
rain but suffers from erosion. So two projects were agreed by the Tanzanian government
to maintain the soil substrat of rainfed maize grown on steep slopes. 4 They managed
neighbouring  areas.  One  had  developed  a  technique  that  could  be  expected  to  be
appropriate. It consisted of planting fodder grasses on contour lines. These grasses take
up little  space,  provide fodder  for  animals  if  the farmers  cut  it  and take it  to  their
livestock, and require little labour. The idea is to retain the soil particles and allow the
water to pass in between the plants. The grasses are to be planted like hedges : 10 cm
wide and in high densities to avoid any gaps through which the captured water may
assemble and, gushing through in great volumes, make gullies. The concept cannot be
qualified as purely physical, since it included references to the use that farmers could
make of the hedges.
68 The other technique is known as fanya juu or throwing soil uphill. It is said to be found in
East Africa only. It was introduced in the Usambara mountains by a project technician
who had learned the technique in Kenya. At distances of about 1m in altitude a trench 60
cm wide and 60 cm deep is dug along the contour and the soil is thrown uphill. At its new
place this soil reduces the slope of the field and therefore the velocity of the run‑off
water. Over time the field above the trench levels out. The particles that the run‑off water
separates from the upper part of the field are deposited on the strip of several meters
wide at the lower edge of the field because the rise constructed with the soil from the
trench slows down the water. In this way the water helps to bring about a desired state
and much less labour is needed than when conventional stone‑walled terraces are built.
The terraces require more labour however than the contour hedges with fodder grasses.
It is quite common for the terraces to be constructed in work parties or through hired
labour.
69 By  1990  the  fodder  grass  project  had  made  little  headway  and  became  increasingly
interested in the fanya juu project that was successful. Almost everywhere terraces were
under construction, a rare sight on any continent and also in SSA. Farmers who had built
terraces declared that the labor invested had been returned within 1.2.5 to 2 years. The
reason was that the terraces made a larger part of the rainfall available for crop growth.
In spite of the high rainfall, water availability for crops had been low because most water
ran off immediately and was not stocked in the soil. At the level of the soil, moisture
conditions were even similar to those of a semi‑arid climate. The new terraces stocked
the water and allowed farmers to grow profitable crops like beans and other vegetables,
along with fruit trees.
70 The explanation of the relative success of the one and the relative failure of the other
does  not  lie  in  their  effectiveness  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  projects :  both
technologies keep the loosened soil particles on the field. The explanation lies rather in
other features. The grasses on the contour lines store little water in the soil, they mainly
produce  fodder  but  this  characteristic  proves  insufficiently  attractive.  The  fanya  juu
terraces  stock so  much water  in  the  soil  that  they allow farmers  to  grow beans.  In
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addition, the technique increases the productivity of the area under trenches : fruit trees
planted there produce well because their roots can reach water for which there is no
competition.
71 What  cognitive  shifts  and  social  networks  can  be  identified  at  the  level  of  the
technicians ? The fodder ridge project was ready to learn from the fanya juu project. It
quickly established good working relationships with its neighbour, copied its approach,
had its technicians trained, in short incorporated fanya juu into its technological offer.
The  technician  of  the  fanya  juu  project  had  worked  many  years  in  soil  and  water
conservation projects in Kenya where he had gained experience with this technology. The
response of the farmers required little adaptation on his part. He was interested mostly in
the construction of the terraces and agreed with the reasons farmers had for building
them. At the level of the project, the rapid spread of the terraces encouraged the fanya juu
project to include rural roads in its offer to allow lorries to enter the area and provide
more farmers with the incentive for building terraces.
72 How  do  the  terraces  relate  to  the  social  networks  of  the  farmers ?  Why  do  these
Usambara farmers wish to grow beans and raise fruit ? Their answer is that it is a new
way to make money in agriculture for they can sell their harvests to traders who resell it
in the capital. Tiffen et al. (1994) have studied a similar transformation of an eroding
landscape into productive and protected one in Kenya's Machakos District inhabited by
Akamba. They note an upsurge in terrace construction and intensified land use in the mid
1960s  and  link  it  to  increasing  population  densities,  education,  increased  social
circulation  creating  capacity  to  develop  new  ideas,  access  to  new  ideas  through
emigration,  improved roads,  the  emergence  of  nearby  markets  and to  the  fanya  juu
concept itself.
73 We now turn to Burkina Faso where a donor started a rural development project in the
North Central province in 1982 that focused primarily on erosion. The project selected
two major erosion control techniques. (The technical data are derived from Vlaar 1992.)
One was the stone row technique. The rows of stones on the fields slow down run off
water and encourage infiltration. The technique was copied from the local farmers who
are said to have put stones on their fields in a pattern of squares. Many farmers however
had not done so because they had to, collect the stones at a point some 5 ‑15 km away.
Here the project intervened by offering the free services of a lorry.
74 The other technology was called digues filtrantes or permeable dikes. They have a different
history. They are made of stones and rocks, built in natural drains. The dikes are 100‑300
m long and 0.5‑1m high. They slow down run off water.  Technical volunteers from a
donor country had built them in natural drains near narrow valley bottoms to protect
these fertile soils against erosion. Later visits showed that farmers used the strip formed
upstream of  the check to grow sorghum. Here harvests  had improved and stabilised
because the run off  water had infiltrated and deposited the nutrient soil  particles  it
transported. 5
75 A project member with a Ph D in physical geography embodied the splitter's view of
erosion control. He made detailed studies of the transport of soil and nutrient particles in
two watersheds. Taking an almost purely physical view of the process and paying no
attention neither to  socio‑economic causes  or  to  farmer strategies,  he recommended
protecting entire watersheds from top to bottom not only with permeable dams and
stone rows but  also contour ridges.  He favoured using earth moving equipment  and
paying work gangs both to achieve a quick pace and because farmers would be unwilling
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to work for free on non‑agricultural land. His plan was opposed by the technicians and
social  scientist  on the team.  They favoured a  participatory approach,  in view of  the
mischief wrought by many public conservation programs that hired labour and earth
moving equipment. Either the ridges would break, due both to lack of maintenance and
poor  construction,  wrecking  havoc  on  the  fields  downstream,  or  the  ridges  simply
disappeared : ten years later Many of them could not be found, not even with maps. Their
emphasis on farmer participation also had strong ideological or ethical foundations.
76 The geographer was sent home and the technicians developed what they termed the mini
watershed approach (aménagement micro bassin versant).  They started to work with the
groupements villageois de développement, GDs for short. These had been created by the
colonial cotton board, had lost their original purpose, and were being revived by the
Sankara government as part  of  its  inspired attempt to make the nation stand on its
economic feet. Membership of the GDs was not obligatory. Most GDs were dominated by
members of the local Mossi elite, some of which had been linked to or were still linked to
the hierarchies that composed the old kingdoms.
77 Time and again the technicians observed the same pattern of response (Vlaar and Brasser
1990). GDs would react enthusiastically to project proposals to organise non remunerated
work parties to construct permeable dams or to load stones on project hired lorries and
unload them near farmer fields so that the farmer could place them along the contours to
slow down run off water. After some weeks or months, the enthusiasm diminished until
no one showed up anymore. It was discovered that the elite dominating the GDs stopped
organising the work parties as soon its fields had been equipped with stones and dams,
making the other inhabitants disappointed, if not angry.
78 The technicians also observed that work parties that had consisted of persons living in
the same wards, usually reached their objectives rapidly and supplied good quality work.
More importantly, their enthusiasm did not turn sour. The technicians had also became
weary  of  other  disadvantages  of  the  mini  watershed  approach.  It  entailed  having  a
greater  number  of  sites  than  they  could  realistically  supervise,  as  the  plots  of  the
members of the elite were not contingent, and many hours of driving were needed for
each hectare  protected.  In  response to  the lasting nature of  the motivation and the
disadvantage of number of hours of driving, they developed a new approach which they
termed aménagement concentré, which may be translated as block approach. The project
decided to bypass the GDs and deal directly with the wards.  The result  was that the
annual production of protected soil multiplied by ten from 300 ha to 3000 ha. It turned
out that the wards possessed the group cohesion needed for each farmer to be confident
that any labour that he gave to a neighbour's field would be returned to him 6.
79 In the meantime, the technicians as a group also made a cognitive shift. Since they valued
a participatory approach, they depended on farmer willingness to invest labour. During
the GD phase farmers had been unwilling to spend labour on non‑agricultural fields of the
village's territory. During the ward phase all efforts became directed towards investment
in agricultural  land,  and especially valley bottoms.  Technical  thinking shifted from a
public  orientation towards watershed protection to a  focus on private investment of
labour in agricultural real estate through work parties. One should note, however, that
individual technicians experienced fewer changes than the project, as no one stayed long
enough to live through more than one change.
80 The first  observation concerns the incompleteness of  the splitters'  view of  irrigation
schemes, terraces and dams. The paradigm that many irrigation engineers adhered to, at
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least  during  the  1980s,  is  useless  when it  comes  to  understanding  how water  flows
through the canals and fields of a scheme. The reason is that the paradigm excludes all
reference to the social links of the Senegalese farmers who operate the scheme.
81 Similarly,  in  Burkina  Faso,  the  physical  geographer  conceptualization  of  the  erosion
process and the technologies to control it excluded farmer livelihood strategies. Young
Burkina farmers compare the return to the investment of labour needed to make the local
soil more productive with the labour investment required to settle in Côte d'Ivoire or one
of the colonising territories of Burkina Faso. Many of them then opt for leaving the Mossi
plateau.
82 The case of the fanya juu and fodder ridge projects is slightly different. The fodder ridge
project included a reference to the farming system in that it proposed grasses that might
be consumed by animals already kept. The fanya juu technology has come to include a
reference to the possibility of planting banana trees in the trenches because that is what
many Kenyan farmers do.  So both technologies contained notions outside the purely
physical  domain.  Nevertheless,  neither  project  linked  its  technology  to  the  new
possibility created by the terraces to growing beans and all sorts of fruits for sale.
83 No developer seems to have known that many farmers were on the verge of growing for
the market but constrained by low levels of available water in the soil. It remains to be
seen whether any anthropologist would have uncovered this. Indeed, it may be doubted
whether farmers knew about it before the first terrace was built. It was perhaps the fanya
juu terrace itself that triggered this idea. These farmers are not unlike ourselves. When
queried  in  1975,  we  would  not  have  asked  for  machines  that  would  replace  our
typewriters but we now regularly find new uses for our computers.
84 The second observation concerns the interpretive flexibility of  schemes,  terraces and
dams. Our three case studies show that to farmers a 20 ha irrigation scheme is a very
different thing than it is to engineers, and that the same applies to the permeable dams
and terraces.
85 The irrigation schemes in Senegal are viewed by most engineers as sites that belong only
to the market economy/commodity circuit. To them, the pumpsets, the construction of
the canals and all other infrastructural expenses represent fixed capital assets that, along
with all variable expenditures for fuel, lubricants and parts, repairs and so on, need to be
recovered  by  selling  produce.  To  the  farmers  by  contrast,  the  village  schemes  are
extensions of the cleared depressions in the floodplain that are no longer accessible to all
inhabitants. These cleared depressions provide harvest security through the guaranteed
availability of moisture, much like the schemes do. The extension link is invisible because
not physical but real enough because economic. Farmers consume the sorghum harvested
in the floodplain and sell little of it, usually only to defray some immediate expenses.
Similarly, during the 1980s they sold only 10‑15% of their rice and used part of their
harvest to pay the bills of the government agency. To the farmers the [harvests of the]
schemes are part of the same social and economic network as the sorghum fields. For
short :  to  many engineers  constructing  the  village  schemes,  a  scheme is  a  capitalist
enterprise and to most farmers it is an extension of the floodplain.
86 We have already shown that engineers and farmers had different views on the fanya juu
terraces. Here, in curious contrast to the village scheme, the non‑market conservation
goals came from the engineers and the stress on 'capitalist' values from the farmers. To
the engineers the terraces were to be put in place for the sole reason that they would stop
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soil erosion. They saw it as the state's responsibility to prevent any further degradation
of the environment To the farmers, the terraces were welcome for the reason that they
provided opportunities for lucrative cash crops.
87 An almost similar difference may be noted with respect to the digues filtrantes. Engineers
employed  by  the  state  installed  permeable  check  dams  in  natural  drains  to  protect
valuable agricultural soil in the valey bottom. Farmers use them to grow sorghum on the
strips of land just upstream of the dams.
88 These differences in interpretations of the functions that an artefact fulfils can in a fairly
straightforward fashion be linked to the networks that keep farmers and engineers alive.
This is however, more evident for the farmers than for the engineers. The engineers give
financial  interpretations  of  the  irrigation  schemes  but  non‑market  reasons  for  their
protection  and  conservation  measures.  If  the  literature  images  technologies  as
sociotechnical  networks  (STNs)  or  hybrids,  our  case  studies  indicate  that  L&W
technologies put in place in SSA with the help of government technicians can perhaps be
said  to  be  doubly  hybrid  since  the  social  relationships  themselves  are  also  hybrids,
mixtures of European and African goals and values.
89 The third observation concerns the fact  that  experiments and non‑successful  models
preceded the development and spread of the village schemes, the fanya juu's  and the
permeable  dams.  Before  the  village  schemes  were  'invented',  the  government  had,
without much avail, experimented with schemes for various types of partial water control
and with agency managed full control irrigation schemes. The extension officers working
in Machakos District in Kenya had developed three types of terraces of which only the
fanya  juu  ones  were  adopted.  The  organisational  model  for  the  construction  of  the
permeable dams with their double function of erosion check (European volunteers) and
production site (Burkinabè farmers) was the outcome of unsuccessful experiments to link
group labour to social control over the labour investment, two of which were described in
this paper.
90 A  fourth  observation  concerns  the  differences  between  L&W  STNs  that  are  being
replicated on the one hand and L&W hybrids that are being used and maintained on the
other. This difference is most marked in the permeable dams. Their construction requires
lorry  transport,  over  200  farmerdays  to  be  supplied  in  a  short  rime  and  technical
assistance  in  designing  the  dam  and  pegging  it  out  The  maintenance  of  the  dams
however, requires a few hours per year only when the owner replaces a couple of stones.
Similarly with the terraces. Constructing them usually requires gang labour, maintaining
them means only desilting the trenches, a job that may be done by one person only.
Similarly again, the construction of the village schemes requires an extensive network of
state agents, who oblige the owners of the site to make it available to the future irrigators
and who supply  technical  and material  assistance  like  earth  moving  equipment  and
topographers,  politicians who help determine the order in which village schemes are
built, village dignitaries and last but not least farmers who invest some 150 working days
in clearing the forest and digging the canals. Once in place, the irrigators can manage the
schemes by themselves if only there are roads that link them to a filling station, repair
shops and an agricultural bank.
91 A  fifth  feature  of  L&W STNs  is  the  extent  to  which  and  ease  with  which  they  are
naturalised.  Akrich (1992) uses this term for technologies that users do not normally
distinguish from the natural environment as being artefacts. A case in point is the baking
oven  that  most  people  who  list  the  technologies  in  their  kitchen,  do  not  mention.
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Similarly, few 'developers' travelling through the floodplain of the Senegal recognise the
cleared depressions as L&W STNs. The same applies to the hillsides terraced through fana
juu.  With  time  the  digues  filtrantes  and  even  the  rice  schemes  may  appear  natural
elements in the landscape.
92 Let us try to spell out some implications that are practical. At present, many Ministries of
Agriculture 1) suppose they know all relevant L&W technologies and 2) disperse their soil
and water technicians over all  eroding areas.  The departments themselves give little
systematic attention to evolving technologies that work because they are conceived as
STNs  and  designed  as  part  of  the  productive  system  of  the  farming  population.
Consequently, each year many technician years are wasted on diffusing standard L&W
technologies to populations who decade after decade refuse to take to them.
93 A first practical implication might therefore be to make a distinction between on the one
hand roving engineers who are to evolve L& W STNs on the basis of farmer reactions and
on the other hand resident engineers who replicate these new L&W STNs. The studies
show that there is no way for Soil and Water Departments to predict what populations are
interested in L& W technologies. One reason is that farmer interest depends on social and
physical factors, only some of which are known, and on economic exit options that the
department's technicians do not know much about Another reason is that farmer interest
depends on features of the technology itself. In that case any latent farmer interest can be
made manifest only through creative analyses of trials and errors followed by similarly
creative synthesising designs. Indeed, much like the way that plant breeders operate.
94 A second implication that is practical consists of using labour investment as an early
indicator of farmer (dis)interest. In L&W technologies, it is the (labour) investment of the
farmer that weaves soil and society into the seamless web that is a STN.
95 A common feature of the three successful cases is that they provided the farmers with
immediate returns to their labour investment. A third implication therefore seems to be
that there is no sense finance programs that cannot prove with farmer response that they
meet (immediate) farmer needs. This holds also for intensification of land use through
irrigation.
96 Another  common  feature  is  that  the  L&  W  technologies  did  not  cause  land  tenure
conflicts (terraces, permeable dams) or if they caused them, which happened occasionally
with the village schemes,  they were resolved quickly.  On the face of  this,  it  may be
concluded that donors should avoid financing L&W technologies that create land tenure
conflicts.
97 And their  joint  reflexive monitoring of  each other.  Whatever the relative power and
authority of the two sets of parties, the weaker party (almost certainly, in developing
countries, the farmers) have an inviolable veto right ;  fanners can simply walk :  away
from the "best laid plans" of technocrats if these fail to resonate in their lives.
98 Distinct life styles and social  worlds are imbued with different values.  As the case of
atomic energy (argued by Douglas and Wildavsky) shows, if these values clash, this clash
cannot be simply reconciled by appeal to "reason", since reason itself is an inseparable
component  of  specific  socio‑technical  ensembles.  Yet,  as  the  case  studies  indicate,
innovation can and does occur, accompanied by ideological back‑tracking to make the
unexpected event appear a logical outcome of either party's prior value commitments.
This back‑tracking is no more than an attempt to save appearances (or face). It would be
simpler  to  admit  that  making  innovation  is  part  of  the  process  of  socio‑technical
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world‑making  (Nelson  Goodman).  In  the  development  cases  discussed  above  it  is
world‑making jointly essayed by representatives of hitherto distinct social worlds.
99 Can this double hybridization be managed to increase the rate at which effective agrarian
innovations  emerge ?  It  seems  to  us  that  hybridization  of  socio‑technical  worlds/
life‑styles  will  always  be  a  historic,  and  place‑specific,  mix,  and  therefore  no  more
predictable as an "utterance" than are pithy aphorisms from superficial knowledge of the
grammar of the language in which they are uttered. The analogy is very precise ‑ since
aphorisms sometimes "break", they therefore make grammar, by extending the range of
what is considered to be possible. Engineers "utter" innovations that fanners may judge,
initially, to be "grammatically incorrect". But the innovation, by forcing a reaction, opens
up  a  new  world  of  possibilities.  Provided  the  innovation  is  seen  and  "read"  (many
disappear  without  trace)  the  situation  is  changed,  whether  or  not  fanners  become
"adopters". As often as not, they may react by considering the "question" to be correctly
posed, but the "answer" deficient ‑ then seeking to respond in different ways of their own
devising.
100 This suggests that good engineering practice should be based not on the idea of perfected
designs, but on a principle of rolling feedback to initiatives that may at times appear as
half‑baked as they are well‑focused. The correct response, we suggest, is not dogmatic
adherence to "sound design", but incorporation of fanners' monitoring of researchers'
initiatives into the next stage of the design process. An example would be plant breeders
carrying out selection experiments on fanner's fields, to see not only what happens in
nature but also to monitor how farmers "read" the scientist's experiments, in order to
incorporate values and priorities that these readings make manifest into further cycles of
selection and testing.
101 We concede that there is still need for a fully‑worked out theory of this kind of double
hybridization  ‑  a  theory  of  socio‑technica1  convergence  under  internationalization/
globalization, equivalent to the linguistic theory of language hybridization in a world of
global convergence (creolization theory). We suggest that such a theory will not come
from a dogmatically‑applied methodological individualism, but from a more pragmatic,
ethnographic,  comparative  analysis  of  social  contexts  associated  with  successful
technology generation. This theory will not be a theory of what people ought to do, but
what they actually to do, when handling socio‑technical change. It will be a theory of
"agrarian creolization".
102 Any such theory will have major practical implications for the healthy management of
technology  generation.  The  past  approach has  been  dominated  by  the  splitter's
perspective.  It  has led to the deliberate isolation of  techno‑specialists  from allegedly
damaging social contexts through the establishment of specialised high‑level ivory‑tower
institutions, of which the rarified Green Revolution research centres might be considered
prime  examples.  Superficial  "participation"  is  unlikely  to  prove  the  answer  to  the
isolation and apparent irrelevance of many such facilities.
103 Lumpers seek to render social contexts for technology generation not less remote but
more real,  by promoting a long‑term relationship between development technologists
and  client  groups,  centred  on  a  "live‑in"  and  "live‑by"  approach  to  the  fruits  of
socio‑technical  hybridization.  This  suggests  that  real  comparative advantage in these
hybrid fields of activity lies with those who are technologically competent and members
of local life worlds.
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104 It was once thought that this live‑in relationship between technologists and the fruits of
their innovation would be too hard to achieve, in developing countries, when quality
work in specialist technical fields was so dependent on highly specialised, place‑specific
research  facilities.  But  the  world  has  changed.  Looser,  more  effective  organizational
arrangements in support of "organic [development] intellectuals" working on problems
of  technology  generation  can  now  be  envisaged,  based  on  the  improvements  in
telecommunications. "Isolated" national research facilities need no longer be cut off from
the global information swim. At the same time further decentralization initiatives might
reinforce and extend the hybridization that already occurs between the partially distinct
socio‑technical worlds inhabited by technology researchers and their clients. If we are
correct in claiming that this hybridization explains the unsung successes outlined in this
paper, then science policy for developing countries should aim at veritable outpourings
of creolized agrarian technologies.
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NOTES
1.Position paper for the 1996 APAD conference in Stuttgart on negotiated development :
brokers, knowledge systems and technologies.
2.For illuminating analyses of other interactions between migrants and farmers on the
one band and the irrigation agency and local development associations on the other, see
Lavigne Delville 1991.
3.Compare Claude Meillassoux who in March 1980 predicted in Le Monde Diplomatique that
700 000 farmers were heading for famine due to irrigation development in the valley. The
well‑known anthropologist misread the social shaping process of land and water
technology in this part of SSA.
4.I am grateful to Lucia Helsloot and Ton Meijers for refreshing my memory and
providing additional information.
5.Source : oral communication J. de Graaf 12 March 1995.
6.After 1990, when a law was approved that uncleared, vacant land could be brought
under the ownership of the person who cleared it or otherwise invested in it., enthusiasm
grew to the extent that the project decided that it would accept only demands to improve
land that had already been cleared.
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